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Silent Growth of Comparative Negligence
in Common Law Courts
David K. Siegel *
T HE COMMON LAW VIEW of contributory negligence theoreti-
cally still obtains in most jurisdictions. Thus, if the plaintiff's
negligence proximately contributes to his resulting injury or
damage, he is barred entirely from recovery. But this rule is
"honored in the breach" in a growing number of jurisdictions
that theoretically do not accept the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence.
Six states openly recognize the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence through statutes of general application. Generally these
statutes provide that where an injury or accident results from
the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant, the rela-
tive negligence of both parties shall be compared, and damages
will be apportioned between the parties according to the amount
of negligence attributable to each.' In other words, the courts
* A.B., Princeton University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 ARKANSAS: Where plaintiff's negligence is "less than that of any per-
son causing the damage," recovery will not be barred, but shall be
diminished in proportion to such contributory negligence." Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 27-1730.1, 2 (Supp. 1961).
GEORGIA: Court decisions have blended the effect of the railroad liability
statute and the general application statute. Ga. Code Ann. § 94-703
(1958) and § 105-603 (1956). Generally, there will be no recovery if
plaintiff fails to exercise ordinary care or if his negligence is equal
to or greater than the negligence of the defendant. In Wright v.
Concrete Co., 107 Ga. App. 190, 129 S. E. 2d 351 (1962), the court
refined the tests for determining whether a plaintiff may recover. It
held that plaintiff's negligence concurring with the defendant's negli-
gence as the proximate cause will diminish but not bar recovery,
except-
1) where the plaintiff fails to exercise ordinary care after knowing of
defendant's negligence;
2) where plaintiff's failure to discover defendant's negligence is tanta-
mount to negligence;
3) where plaintiff's negligence is the sole proximate cause.
MISSISSIPPI: "The fact that the person injured" may have been con-
tributorily negligent shall not bar a recovery, but "damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person injured . . ." Miss. Code Ann. § 1454 (1942).
NEBRASKA: A plaintiff's "slight" contributory negligence shall not bar a
recovery if the defendant's negligence "was gross by comparison," but
such contributory negligence will be "considered by the jury in miti-
gation of damages." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (1943).
SOUTH DAKOTA: Same as Nebraska. S. D. Code § 47.0304-1 (Supp.
1952).
(Continued on next page)
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view the total negligence, and reduce the plaintiff's recovery in
proportion to the role he played in causing the accident.
Advocates of the doctrine of comparative negligence point
to the equitable effect of these statutes. Meanwhile, supporters
of the common law disclaim the doctrine as being too difficult to
administer and a decided threat to the entire fabric of liability
insurance.
Whatever the arguments on either side, the fact remains that
many of the states recognizing the common law rule of contribu-
tory negligence have enacted employer and railroad liability
statutes which in fact apply the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence. Most of these jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to recover
irrespective of the amount of his negligence. 2 Other states deny
recovery only when the plaintiff is grossly negligent.3 Still others
allow recovery only when the plaintiff's negligence is slight and
the defendant's is gross in comparison.4 None specify recovery
only when the plaintiff's negligence is not as great as defend-
ant's.5
In addition, the Federal Employer's Liability Act6 provides
that the doctrine of comparative negligence applies to all forms
of negligence, including gross negligence. In Lindgren v. United
(Continued from preceding page)
WISCONSIN: A plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar a recovery
if the negligence of the defendant exceeds that of the plaintiff. Wis.
Stat. § 331.045 (1957). Courts have clarified this statute in its relation
to certain common law defenses. In McConville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N. W. 2d 14 (1962), assumed risk was overruled
as a complete defense with respect to host-guest cases (Wisconsin has
no guest statute). Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N. W. 2d 21
(1962), abolished assumed risk in cases involving farm laborers in
favor of comparative negligence. In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1,
114 N. W. 2d 105 (1962), "gross" negligence is abolished; conduct
previously characterized as gross negligence will be treated as ordi-
nary for purposes of comparison and contribution.
2 Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-806 (1956); Florida Stat. § 768.06 (1944);
Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. § 66-238 (1949); Minnesota Stat. Ann. § 219.79
(1947); Nevada Rev. Stat. § 41.150 (1957); North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 60-67
(1960); North Dakota Cent. Code § 49-16-03 (1960); Oregon Rev. Stat.
§ 764.220 (1953); South Carolina Code § 58-1232 (1952); Texas Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. Art. 6440 (1926); Virginia Code Ann. § 8-642 (1950); Wyoming
Stat. Ann. § 37-225 (1959).
3 Iowa Code § 85.15 (1958); Michigan Stat. Ann. § 17.141 (1960); Montana
Rev. Code Ann. § 92-201 (1949).
4 District of Columbia Code Ann. § 44-402 (Supp. 1961); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4113.07 (page 1954).
5 Only Arkansas applies this standard, Ark. Stat. Ann. 81-1202 (1960),
which is similar to that in the statute of general application, supra, n. 1.
6 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1959).
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States,7 the Supreme Court extended the provisions of the FELA
to hold that they also apply to the Merchant Marine Act of
1920.8
Thus there are several jurisdictions upholding both the doc-
trine of comparative negligence and the common law rule of
contributory negligence.
Plaintiffs bringing actions in these jurisdictions seek, where-
ever appropriate, to come within the scope of the liability statutes
if there are suggestions of contributory negligence. In a Vir-
ginia case9 plaintiff attempted to show that defendant's loco-
motive engineer failed to ring the bell as his train approached
the grade crossing. Such a warning was required by a municipal
ordinance and would invoke the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence under state law 0 if it was violated. If the plaintiff had
succeeded in his contention (and if he had remembered to prove
the municipal ordinance) comparative negligence would have
prevailed over contributory negligence.
Similarly, defendant's failure to sound a whistle or bell one
mile outside the city limits brought plaintiff's action within the
liability statute, in spite of the fact that the collision with the de-
cedent's truck was some distance inside the city limits.i
Aside from statutes providing recognition of the doctrine of
comparative negligence, courts also apply the maritime doctrine
of comparative negligence. Collisions between boats, or collisions
of boats with bridges and like stationary objects, often result
in enormous damages. To avoid the disastrous financial conse-
quences which might arise from applying the common law rule
of contributory negligence in such cases, courts in the United
States have adopted the view that damages shall be apportioned
when both parties contribute to the accident. But only where
plaintiff's negligence is slight is his recovery mitigated according
to the amount of his negligence. In all other instances, i.e., where
both parties are substantially negligent, damages are divided
equally between plaintiff and defendant.
7 281 U. S. 38 (1930).
8 41 Stat. 988 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 861 (1959).
9 Norfolk P. B. L. R. Co. v. C. F. Mueller Co., 197 Va. 533, 90 S. E. 2d 135
(1955).
10 Va. Code Ann. § 56-416 (1950).
11 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Perkins, 223 Miss. 891, 79 So. 2d 459 (1955).
Sept., 1963
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This course was followed in Petition of Adams.12 The court
found that the defendant was very negligent in maneuvering his
boat in the harbor channel, but that the plaintiff carelessly de-
layed reversing his engines to avoid collision. The court then
held that the plaintiff's negligence was far too clear and sub-
stantial to bring the case within the "major-minor fault rule,"
even though defendant's negligence was far more flagrant. There-
fore, damages were to be divided equally. On a petition for re-
hearing, which was denied, the court reluctantly amplified its
earlier decision by stating that the damages were not to be
proportioned in accordance with comparative faults, since the
equal division rule was too well established to depart from it
without some sanction from a higher court.
The maritime doctrine of comparative negligence has also
been applied in personal injury suits. In Hurst v. Point Landing,
Inc.,13 plaintiff, a guard for a drydock company, fell into the open
hatch of a barge, injuring himself severely. He brought suits
against everyone in sight-the barge owner, the tug company
that towed the barge, and his employer. In excusing all but the
employer from liability, the court held that since the barge was
in for repair of, among other things, the jammed-open hatch
cover, the only parties that could be negligent were the em-
ployer and the plaintiff. The court went on to find that the em-
ployer should have warned the plaintiff, and the plaintiff should
have looked where he was going. Since each party's negligence
was substantial, the plaintiff was awarded only fifty per cent of
his damages.
Further than these applications of the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence, most of the common law states refuse to go.
Some, however, look longingly at the doctrine as a possible
answer for the contributorily negligent plaintiff who suffers large
damages, much as ship owners suffered as the maritime doctrine
developed.
The question of comparative negligence sometimes arises in
instructing juries on the effects of negligence by defendant and
plaintiff. Care must be taken in these instructions, particularly
if the plaintiff's case appeals to the jury. This requires meticu-
lous emphasis by the court on the jurors' duty should they find
12 125 F. Supp. 110 (S. D. N. Y. 1954); aff'd, 237 F. 2d 884; cert. den., 77 S. Ct.
364, 352 U. S. 971 (1957).
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that the plaintiff's actions helped to bring about his injury.
Taken out of context, these instructions sometimes must appear
hard-hearted to a sensitive juror. In a Delaware case 14 the court
held that if plaintiff was not free of contributory negligence, he
cannot recover. The law will not attempt to measure or appor-
tion the negligence attributable to each party. The law has no
scales to weigh contributing fault.
A North Carolina court was not quite so careful in its in-
structions, which were held to be in error on defendant's appeal.
The court charged the jury that plaintiff's negligence, if any,
would not bar recovery unless it directly and proximately con-
tributed to his injury. But the jurors apparently were uncertain
and returned for additional instruction which led to the error,
the court instructing that plaintiff's contribution to his own in-
jury would not prevent recovery if the defendant's negligence,
when compared to the plaintiff's, was the proximate cause of
injury. The higher court held that these instructions embodied
the principle of comparative negligence, which is not applicable
in North Carolina.15
A Minnesota court fell into similar error recently, when it
charged that if the plaintiff were guilty of, say, five per cent negli-
gence, he could not recover. The higher court's words made it
appear that the heresy of comparative negligence was forever
cropping up in that state: 16
This court has repeatedly stated that no reference should be
made in a jury charge to a comparative degree or percentage
of negligence or contributory negligence. If the plaintiff con-
tributed directly to the accident so that the accident was
partly or wholly due to his own fault, he cannot recover.
The majority of cases in which the question of comparative
negligence is raised involve automobiles. Plaintiff and defendant
collide head on, for example, when both continue to drive toward
each other through a dense cloud of smoke.1 7 In an intersection
collision, defendant failed to yield the right of way, but plaintiff
was driving on the wrong side of the road.s In a nighttime
13 212 F Supp. 160 (E. D. La. 1962).
14 Willis v. Schlagenhauf, 188 A. 700 (Del. 1936).
15 Cashatt v. Asheville Seed Co., 202 N. C. 383, 162 S. E. 893 (1932).
16 Busch v. Lilly, 257 Minn. 343, 101 N. W. 2d 199 (1960).
17 McClelland v. Harper, 38 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 1948).
18 Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Sanders, 362 P. 2d 90 (Okla. 1961).
Sept., 1963
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head-on collision, decedent was speeding, defendant was on the
wrong side of the road, and neither was keeping a proper look-
out.19 Plaintiff, who had only slight vision in one eye, failed to
judge properly the distance of defendant's approaching car.
Crossing the four-lane highway on foot, he was struck by de-
fendant's car.20 Contributory negligence barred this plaintiff
from recovery.
This last case upheld an earlier California decision in which
the plaintiff was struck as he crossed the street at night against
a stop light. He pleaded that the defendant had the last clear
chance, because he must have known of the plaintiff's peril.
But the court held that to rule on last clear chance by conjecture
rather than by evidence would be, in effect, to apply the doc-
trine of comparative negligence. It went on to observe that al-
though the doctrine may be just and fair, the California Legis-
lature had not seen fit to adopt it.21
Similar court refusal to recognize the doctrine occurred in
Condon v. Epstein.22 There the plaintiff collided with the de-
fendant as the latter was making a U-turn in mid-block. The
court pointed out that the defendant must exercise extra care in
such a maneuver, while the plaintiff must exercise ordinary
care; and if the plaintiff were exercising ordinary care, how
could he have failed to see the defendant? As in the Haerdter
case, 23 the court looked to the legislature to recognize the need
for a comparative negligence statute.
Preceding the Condon decision by a few years was Falk v.
Crystal Hall, Inc.,24 where the court warned against any devia-
tions from the common law rule of contributory negligence.
In the Falk case there were two defendants-the coal delivery
company, which was responsible for knocking down a fence over
which plaintiff tripped, and the landlord, who let the fence lie
there. Following plaintiff's successful suit, the landlord tried to
collect from the coal company for the damages he had to pay
the plaintiff. In commenting on use of the terms "active negli-
19 Alexander v. Appell Drilling Co., 290 S. W. 2d 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
20 Summers v. Burdick, 191 Cal. App., 2d 464, 13 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1961).
21 Haerdter v. Johnson, 92 Cal. App. 2d 547, 207 P. 2d 855 (1949).
22 168 N. Y. S. 2d 189, 8 Misc. 2d 674 (1957).
23 Supra, note 21.
24 105 N. Y. S. 2d 66, 200 Misc. 979 (1951); aff'd, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 277, 279
App. Div. 1071, 1073; app. and rearg. den., 114 N. Y. S. 2d 660.
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gence" (applied to the coal company) and "passive negligence"
(applied to the landlord), the court observed that such legal
jargon arises from comparative negligence. It further stated that
the doctrine was struggling to obtain a foothold in controversies
between two defendants, but that the common law of New York
refused to recognize it. [See the Ohio case below.]
Recently in the District of Columbia, a similar question
arose. A bus and taxi collided, injuring passengers who sued
both the bus company and the taxi company. Following settle-
ment of these actions, the bus company brought action against
the taxi company for contribution. In reversing a lower court's
verdict for the bus company, the court pointed out that since the
doctrine of comparative negligence was not recognized in the
District of Columbia, the damages could not be apportioned be-
tween the two parties.25
Damage awards present another problem area, where a jury
may introduce, on its own, what is tantamount to the doctrine
of comparative negligence. Torn by conflicting evidence, the jury
renders a compromise verdict, awarding what the plaintiff be-
lieves are inadequate damages, and what the defendant believes
should have been a verdict for him.
Two New Jersey decisions demonstrate one approach to this
situation. In one case, plaintiff's damages as a result of an auto
collision were established at $432.12, and defendant's at $225. The
jury returned a verdict of $300 for the plaintiff. The court then
proceeded to set aside the verdict, and entered judgment for the
plaintiff for the full amount of his damages. On defendant's ap-
peal, the court noted that when the jury returns a compromise
verdict, a court must order a new trial, for it cannot set aside
the verdict.26
This decision upheld the earlier decision rendered in Juliano
v. Abeles.2 7 There plaintiff appealed on the question of grossly
inadequate damages, and the court ordered a new trial on the
ground that the award represented a compromise. The court
went on to say that a jury cannot compromise for the purposes
of reaching agreement on a verdict, as the comparative degree of
culpability may not be taken into consideration in assessing dam-
ages resulting from negligence.
25 D. C. Transit System, Inc. v. Garman, 301 F. 2d 568 (D. C. Cir. 1962).
26 Stalter v. Schuyler, 135 N. J. L. 228, 51 A. 2d 213 (1947).
27 114 N. J. L. 510, 177 A. 666 (1935).
Sept., 1963
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In a recent Washington decision, however, conflicting evi-
dence did not appear to be the jury's only reason for returning
a compromise verdict. Rather, there may have been a sugges-
tion of contributory negligence. Plaintiff and defendant, both
women, stopped at a couple of bars and had a few drinks to-
gether. Plaintiff then let defendant drive her car, and an acci-
dent followed in which plaintiff was injured. Although finding
defendant liable, the jury awarded the plaintiff the exact amount
of her doctor, dentist, and hospital bills, plus the repair of her
car. When plaintiff appealed, the Supreme Court held that the
damages were inadequate since they provided for no pain and
suffering. Further, both liability and damages must be retried
where there is a compromise verdict. 2s
In the oft-cited Pennsylvania case of Karcesky v. Laria,
29
the evidence was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs were struck
by defendant's car or whether they walked into the side of it.
The jury rendered a compromise verdict, and plaintiffs appealed
on the ground of inadequate damages. In upholding the trial
court's verdict, the Supreme Court ruled:
Where the evidence of negligence or contributory negli-
gence, or both, is conflicting or not free from doubt, a trial
judge has the power to uphold the time-honored right of a
jury to render a compromise verdict. . . . The doctrine of
comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not rec-
ognized by the courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical
matter they are frequently taken into consideration by a
jury.
Tennessee applies yet another view. While holding that the
doctrine of comparative negligence is not recognized in Tennes-
see,30 it limits this view to cases where plaintiff and defendant
both are proximately negligent. In other words, if a plaintiff is
proximately negligent, his recovery will be barred. But his re-
mote negligence may be looked to in mitigation of damages.
What is remote? A few cases help clarify the Tennessee view.
Plaintiff and his wife were traveling on a rain-swept high-
way, slightly under the speed limit of 65 m.p.h., when a mail
carrier drove his car onto the road ahead of them. Too late
plaintiff realized how slowly the mail carrier's car was moving.
He applied the brakes and skidded into an oncoming truck. His
28 Shaw v. Browning, 367 P. 2d 17 (Wash. 1962).
29 382 Pa. 227, 114 A. 2d 150, 154 (1955).
30 Denton v. Watson, 16 Tenn. App. 451, 65 S. W. 2d 196 (1932).
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wife suffered multiple injuries which caused her excruciating
pain and her eventual death. Plaintiff asked for damages of $25,-
000 for himself and $200,000 for his wife. The court recognized
that plaintiff may have been driving too fast for the road condi-
tions, but held that the plaintiff's negligence was not the cause of
injury and did not proximately concur with defendant's (mail
carrier) negligence. The court then awarded the plaintiff
$4575.45 for himself, and $41,838.32 for his wife.3'1
A Tennessee Court of Appeals went further when the ques-
tion of a plaintiff's negligence was raised. Plaintiff drove her
car at about 30 miles per hour down a steep hill and around a
sharp bend in the road. There she ran into the defendant's truck,
which was stopped in the wrong lane of the highway. Again,
there was the issue of what would have been a safe speed. In
upholding the plaintiff's cause, the court ruled that where a plain-
tiff was not guilty of willful and wanton negligence, the suit
could be maintained; failure to exercise ordinary care would not
bar the action if defendant were guilty of a higher degree of
negligence. 3 2
In another case, the defendant failed to barricade an unsafe
overpass road which it was responsible for maintaining. The
plaintiff, a minor who had been drinking before the accident,
drove onto the road leading to the overpass. The road was
strange to him, and he failed to negotiate the turn onto the over-
pass, crashing onto the tracks below. In holding for the plain-
tiff, the court upheld the Tennessee rule that remote contributory
negligence will mitigate damages, while proximate contributory
negligence will bar recovery entirely.33
One other area where common law jurisdictions smile on
the doctrine of comparative negligence may be found in cases in-
volving the law of a foreign jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of
Texas held that the doctrine of comparative negligence, which
applied in South Dakota, did not violate the public policy of
Texas. Therefore, the doctrine could be invoked by the plaintiff
since the accident had occurred in South Dakota.3 4
al Cline v. U. S., 214 F. Supp. 66 (E. D. Tenn. 1962).
32 Fontaine v. Mason Dixon Freight Lines, 357 S. W. 2d 631 (Tenn. App.
1961).
33 Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Smith, 264 F. 2d 428 (6th Circ. 1959).
34 Flaiz v. Moore, 359 S. W. 2d 872 (Tex. 1962).
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Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court allowed plaintiff to
recover under the law of Quebec, where the parties had collided.
The court overruled the trial court's verdict barring the plain-
tiff's recovery because of his contributory negligence, and held
that the law of the locus, not the forum, applied.3 5
Ohio now appears to have accepted the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence as between joint tort feasor defendants, by calling
it "indemnity" from a "primary" tort feasor who did not pay, to
a "secondary" tort feasor who did pay.30
Thus, while many states give no distinct statutory recognition
to the doctrine of comparative negligence, they find themselves
in fact giving tacit approval of the doctrine while puritanically
adhering to the common law approach in theory.
35 Goldman v. Beaudry, 170 A. 2d 636 (Vt. 1961).
36 Ohio Fuel Gas Co. v. Pace Excavating Co., 187 N. E. 2d 89 (Ohio App.
1963).
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